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sources (Tsfati & Ariely, 2014; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003) and to rely more on their political predispositions when 
voting (Ladd, 2010). Ideally, citizens’ trust in the media is closely linked to media operating independently from 
vested interests (both political and economic) in transparent and free democracies. In countries where news 
media are (subjectively) perceived to be shaped by “undue” influences from political and business actors, trust 
is expected to be low. 
 
The discussion about trust in news is particularly relevant in today’s news media landscape. During the 
past years, we have observed a seismic shift in how people use news and which sources they rely on. People 
are more likely than ever to use nonmainstream sources for news (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & 
Nielsen, 2017). By nonmainstream news sources we refer to digital-born news sources or social media. These 
changes in news consumption have fueled a discussion in academia, the news media industry, and the public 
sphere. On the one hand, the prominence of digital news has enabled a reciprocal relationship between 
journalists and the audience (Lewis, Holton, & Coddington, 2014), with the inclusion of user-generated content 
and with journalists more easily writing about their editorial decisions potentially enhancing users’ trust in the 
media (Grosser, Hase, & Blöbaum, 2016). On the other hand, following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the 
discussion has moved toward the spread of misinformation on platforms such as Facebook. 
 
As news consumption patterns have changed over time, so has trust in news. For instance, trust in 
news has continued to fall in the U.S. following a two-decade period characterized by high levels of trust in news 
from the 1950s until the 1970s (Ladd, 2012). Furthermore, the move of the audience to digital news sources 
has been met with skepticism by journalists and news organizations. The vast majority of journalists surveyed 
in the U.S. and Canada claimed that social media platforms have decreased trust in journalism (Rashidian et 
al., 2018). However, in other countries, scholars observe rather stable levels of trust in the media (Hanitzsch, 
Van Dalen, & Steindl, 2018). Thus, the varying levels of trust in news over time in different countries, the 
changes in how we consume news and the potential implications of these changes call for a reexamination of 
factors related to trust in news. 
 
Following this rationale, we ask: Is nonmainstream digital news consumption today associated with 
lower levels of trust in news? Are perceptions of undue political and business influences on media associated 
with lower levels of trust? In addition, given the large country-level differences in trust, we also ask whether 
structural factors such as press freedom and the size of the public service broadcaster (PSB) affect trust in news. 
 
Using data from the 2017 Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey (Newman et al., 2017), which 
allow us to use detailed survey items on news consumption in a set of diverse 35 countries, we find that while 
(a) using traditional news sources (TV, print and their websites) and nonmainstream news sources (digital-born 
news websites, social media) are both associated with higher levels of trust in news, (b) using social media as 
a main source of news is associated with lower levels of trust in news. We further find that (c) perceiving the 
news media as being unduly influenced by political and business interests is associated with lower levels of trust 
in news. At the country-level, our findings suggest that (d) the levels of press freedom and the audience share 
of the PSB are not significantly associated with trust in news. 
 
In the first part of the article, we discuss trust in institutions and trust in news, we position our work 
in relation to existing research on correlates of trust in news at both the individual and the aggregate level and 
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develop our hypotheses. Second, we present our data and the operationalization of key variables. Third, we 
present the results, and fourth, we discuss the implications and the limitations of findings, as well as 
opportunities for future research. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Trust in institutions is important for democracy. Trust in political institutions has been linked to 
voting turnout, broader political participation, attitudes toward policies or interpersonal trust (Levi & Stoker, 
2000), while it creates conditions where it is easier for incumbents to succeed (Hetherington, 1998). 
Whether citizens express trust or distrust in political institutions is a reflection of their political lives (Levi & 
Stoker, 2000). As research shows, there is correlation between trust in different institutions in a society 
(e.g., Jackob, 2012). Newton and Norris (2000) highlight the strong association of trust in political 
institutions with social trust: In countries with corruption and low social trust, it is difficult to “build the kind 
of vibrant civil society that spurs strong government performance, and the result will be low citizen 
confidence in political and public institutions” (p.12). Political trust is also connected to trust in media. 
Hanitzsch et al. (2018) showed that trust in political institutions is strongly associated with trust in the 
press, a phenomenon that they call “trust nexus.” They further found that the correlation is becoming 
stronger over time and it is more powerful in politically polarized countries, findings also corroborated by 
Tsfati and Cohen (2005). In addition, trust in news media is an important precondition for media to have 
positive effects for democracy. Ladd’s (2010, 2012) research in the U.S. shows that those who do not trust 
the news media tend to rely more on their partisan predispositions and not on new developments when 
voting. Thus, the positive effects of news media on democracy (e.g. learning about politicians when 
evaluating them) are in part dependent on trust in news. 
 
Recently, trust in news has been in the midst of a public discussion about democracy in many 
countries. First, attacks against the news media are high on the agenda of many populist politicians around 
the world (Krämer, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), with effects on individuals holding populist attitudes 
(Fawzi, 2019; Schulz, Wirth, & Müller, 2018). Most prominently, in the United States, Donald Trump uses 
the term “fake news” to discredit news media that he does not like. Second, a number of high profile 
scandals involving news organizations have been extensively visible, from the News of The World scandal 
to the recent scandal involving a journalist inventing news stories in Germany’s highly reputed Spiegel 
magazine. These developments are partly behind the decrease in trust in news during the past years in 
countries such as the United States (Hanitzsch et al., 2018) and elevate the importance of examining factors 
associated with trust the news. 
 
All these discussions also take place because the way we use news has changed drastically during 
the past years. The emergence of distributed platforms such as social media has further disrupted the 
business of news and also the way we navigate the online news environment. These changes highlight the 
importance of studying the relationship between trust in news and the various ways how news is used. In 
the sections that follow, we present previous research on individual-level variables and trust, followed by a 
discussion on how country-level variables affect perceptions of trust in different countries. 
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News Consumption and News Media Trust 
 
Research on the relationship between news consumption and news media trust has shown that its 
direction depends on the type of news consumption of (individual) users. Tsfati and Cappella (2003) found 
that using mainstream news sources (print, TV) is associated with higher levels of general trust in news, 
while using non-mainstream news (talk radio and online campaign information) is associated with lower 
levels of trust in news. More recently, Tsfati and Ariely’s (2014) cross-country study showed that exposure 
to news in TV and newspapers is positively correlated with news media trust, whereas exposure to news on 
the Internet is negatively correlated with news media trust. According to the authors, this may be explained 
by the nonmainstream or “alternative” character of news on the Web. Nonmainstream news has been shown 
before to be correlated with mistrust in news, particularly when it comes to highly partisan news (Ladd, 
2011). Similarly, Tsfati (2010) demonstrated, using data from 2004, that the use of mainstream online sites 
is correlated with higher levels of trust in news, whereas low trust in news is correlated with the use of 
nonmainstream online sites. 
 
Since the publication of these studies, the online news media environment has evolved 
dramatically. It is indicative that in Tsfati’s (2010) study, nonmainstream news exposure was defined as 
exposure to independent and right-wing websites, while there is no discussion of social media and other 
distributed pathways to news. Now, around 93% of adults in the U.S. gets their news online, with 67% 
getting it via social media (Shearer & Gottfried, 2017), and the share appears to be even higher in Southern 
European or Latin American countries (Newman et al., 2017). Although news users can consume all sorts 
of news via social media (including news from mainstream news sources), news use in these platforms has 
distinctive characteristics when compared with direct news use. The selection of news is algorithmic and 
editorial, and in most cases users are not able to recall the news brand they used (Kalogeropoulos, Fletcher, 
& Nielsen, 2018). The emergence of distributed sources proceeds hand in hand with alternative news source 
consumption: 40% of online news users across 35 countries report using a digital-born news outlet during 
a typical week (Newman et al., 2017). 
 
Very little research has examined how consuming news via different means is associated with trust 
in news in today’s complex and distributed media landscape. One recent study (Fletcher & Park, 2017) 
showed that in 11 countries, preference for nonmainstream news sources (digital-born outlets, blogs, or 
social media) was found to be associated with low levels of trust in news. Going one step further, we take 
a deeper look at news media consumption patterns and examine how using different news sources and 
choosing a main source of news is associated with trust in 35 countries. Based on the findings of Tsfati and 
Cappella (2003) and Fletcher and Park (2017) as outlined in this section, we hypothesize that 
nonmainstream news use (social media and digital-born outlets2) will be associated with lower levels of trust 
in news while using mainstream news sources (TV, print, and legacy news outlets) will be associated with 
higher levels of trust in news. 
 
2 We include digital-born outlets in our definition of alternative outlets since they tend to differentiate 
themselves from legacy news outlets (Carlson & Usher, 2016). We follow a similar typology of 
nonmainstream news as Fletcher and Park (2017). 
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H1: Using mainstream news sources (TV, print and their websites) will be positively associated to trust 
in news. 
 
H2: Using nonmainstream news sources (digital-born news outlets, social media) will be negatively 
associated to trust in news. 
 
H3: Using nonmainstream sources (digital-born outlets, social media) as main source of news will be 
negatively associated to trust in news.3 
 
Trust and Perception of Undue Influences on News Media 
 
Another individual-level factor associated with trust in news is the perception that the news media 
are not independent from “undue” business and political influences. When Newman and Fletcher (2017) 
examined the reasons behind mistrust in news by studying open-ended survey responses, they find that the 
primary reason why people mistrust the news media in 10 Western countries is a perception of a political or 
a commercial bias. More particularly, respondents talked about “deliberately distorted information” (p. 19), 
news outlets that have their own political agenda or that are “overwhelmingly in the hands of oligarchs” (p. 
22), or news media that favor some interests over others. 
 
Research in political science has shown that trust in political institutions is dependent on the 
perception of corruption of public officials. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) show that there is a negative 
effect of perception of corruption on people’s beliefs about government in 16 countries, particularly for 
nongovernment supporters. Others find similar conditioning and conditional effects in relation to corruption 
and trust. Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) found that perceptions of corruption have a negative effect on 
institutional trust, particularly for educated individuals. Those conducting regional-specific studies have 
found similar findings. Chang and Chu (2006) find that perceptions of corruption have strong trust-eroding 
effects in Asian democracies, and Seligson (2002) finds that in four Latin American countries, exposure to 
corruption is related to lower levels of trust in the political system and even lower interpersonal trust. 
 
A parallel stream of research has focused on media commercialization. As Tsfati and Ariely (2014) 
set out, the debate on whether media commercialization is damaging for democracy is an old one (as noted 
in Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1948; Norris, 2001). Much of this debate has focused on the various contrasting 
affordances of public sector and commercial television (Aarts & Semetko, 2003; de Vreese, Banducci, 
Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 2006; Iyengar & Kinder, 2010). Ashley, Poepsel, and Willis (2010) found that 
increased knowledge of media ownership may make news users more likely to be skeptical about the 
credibility of news organizations. 
 
 
3 A common way to view the relationships between news exposure and trust is that exposure to news 
influences trust in news. However, research has also shown that trust in news affects news exposure 
patterns (e.g., Tsfati & Capella, 2003). Given the cross-sectional nature of our study, we study associations 
and not the direction of the causal relationship between news exposure and trust. 
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Based on the research findings outlined in this section, we hypothesize that perceptions of undue 
outside influences on media will be negatively correlated with trust in news media. In this study, we test 
perceptions of influences on the individual level and not on the aggregate level, as in most other studies 
that use aggregate measures of corruption perception (e.g., Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). 
 
H4. Perceptions of undue outside influences (political or commercial) on media will be negatively 
correlated with news media trust. 
 
Cross-Country Correlates of News Media Trust 
 
In this section, we are looking at how country-level factors are correlated with trust in news given 
the large country variations in trust in news. Our rationale for examining country level variables on top of 
individual-level ones is related to how structures can influence attitudes toward institutions. This is why we 
are focusing on factors such as freedom of press and the size of the PSB in different countries. First, we are 
looking at freedom of press. This variable works complementary to perceptions of freedom of press 
measured on the individual level, as seen above. 
 
Freedom of Press and Media Trust 
 
Political science literature has long argued that a free and independent press is essential to the process 
of democratization. It has been found to improve government accountability, act as a contributor toward 
development of informed public discourse (Sen, 1999), and, importantly, to reduce corruption (Chowdhury, 
2004; Freille, Haque, & Kneller, 2007; Persson & Tabellini, 2002). Literature investigating the relationship of 
trust and corruption establishes that citizens everywhere are watchful of the lack of honesty and unethical 
behavior in their respective governments (Chowdhury 2004). Some of the most straightforward tools of 
combating corruption are ensuring freedom of the press, transparency, and gender equality (Blind, 2007; 
Kaufmann, 2005). Moehler and Singh (2011) find that citizens tend to trust private media in less free African 
countries, and in more democratic African countries citizens tend to trust public media more. Freille et al. 
(2007) find that restrictions to press freedom lead to higher corruption, that both political and economic 
influences on the media are strongly and robustly related to corruption, and that the direction of causation 
runs from a freer press to lower corruption. These findings lead us to the fifth hypothesis: 
 
H5: Higher rates of freedom of the press will be positively correlated with trust in news. 
 
Public Service Broadcaster and Media Trust 
 
We further look at the relationship between news media trust and the presence of a PSB. By definition, 
PSBs serve the public, though research suggests that there is large variation in public service media 
independence from country to country (Hanretty, 2010). In terms of its formal structure (media law, 
organizational ties, etc.), the norms, practices and the actual content produced, public service broadcasting is 
ideally independent from both the political system and the economic system. Independent journalism, as 
opposed to journalism attached to the state or political parties, as in the era of the “party press,” or unlike 
journalism following commercial imperatives, is shaped by a truly “public logic” (Brants & van Praag, 2006). 
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This follows a “trustee model” (Schudson, 1999), which seems best to inform, control, and provide a platform 
for debate and, in the end, help citizens. Against this normative background stressing the independence of 
media, one could argue that citizens tend to put their trust in those media that fulfil these criteria. 
 
One possible driver of trust in news media is therefore trust in media’s actual independence, which 
applies especially to public service broadcasting—but only under certain conditions. Evidence for this comes 
from a study by Tsfati and Ariely (2014), who looked at data from the World Values Survey and found that 
state ownership of television is positively associated with trust in media in democratic societies and 
negatively associated with trust in media in nondemocratic societies. This highlights the fact that PSBs in 
nondemocratic societies are perceived more as mouthpieces of state actors and the ruling elite, reducing 
trust in media, whereas in democratic societies they are perceived more as bodies independent from political 
elites, serving the public as a fourth estate and thus increasing trust in media. 
 
In a meta-analysis of the studies on the political, social, and cultural impact of PSBs in democratic 
societies (Nielsen, Fletcher, Sehl, & Levy, 2016), the authors conclude that studies link the presence of 
public service media to an overall higher degree of trust in both institutions and individuals. Related to trust, 
public service media also are able to promote inclusivity and social cohesion by helping people develop a 
more realistic understanding of the society they live in. As Schmitt-Beck and Wolsing (2010) showed, higher 
levels of PSB use are correlated with higher levels of social trust. At the same time, the authors state that 
there is not enough research yet to establish a clear, evidence-based consensus. One of the more recent 
studies based on surveys (but not with a panel design) points at the importance of PSBs for people’s trust 
in the media. A study of trust in news in 13 Western democratic countries showed that an individual’s use 
of public broadcasting (combining online and off-line use) is significantly positively correlated with trust in 
the media across all 13 countries (Schranz, Schneider, & Eisenegger, 2018). 
 
In sum, though there might not be hard (statistical) evidence on the positive link of PSB and media 
trust, the indications from available studies at least seem to support this link and, importantly, do not seem 
to show the opposite—namely, that PSB is a driver of distrust. On the macro level, then, at least in those 
democratic societies where government interference in the media is comparatively low, one would expect 
that in countries with higher rates of PSB use, trust in news will be higher. 
 
H6: Higher rates of PSB use will be positively correlated with trust in news. 
 
Method 
 
To test the aforementioned relationships, we employ a framework that allows us to examine a 
number of different countries. We use data from the 2017 Reuters Institute Digital News Report (Newman 
et al., 2017) survey, an online survey using a panel that is representative of the online population of each 
country included in the study.4 The countries included in the sample are from Europe, the Americas, and 
 
4 The markets are U.S., UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, 
Croatia, Greece, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Canada, 
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Asia-Pacific. The sample encompasses all Western media systems and includes countries with varying levels 
of trust in news and press freedom, as is seen in the tables in the Appendix. The survey was conducted from 
mid-January to early February 2017. The survey data were weighted by YouGov, to match census/industry 
accepted data, such as age, gender, and region, to represent the total population of the country. Because 
the main focus of the study is news consumption patterns, respondents who responded to a screener 
question that they have not consumed any news during the past month were excluded from the survey. 
Those who were excluded amounted to 3% on average for each country. The number of respondents was 
more than 2,000 in every country, apart from Taiwan (1,014 respondents). 
 
Measures 
 
The dependent variable was “trust in news.” The respondents were asked to denote whether they 
agree or disagree in a 1–5-point Likert scale with the following statement: “I think you can trust most news 
most of the time.” Early in the survey, respondents were given a definition suggesting that “by news we 
mean national, international, regional/local news and other topical events accessed via any platform (radio, 
TV, newspaper or online).” Table A in the Appendix lists the descriptive statistics for trust in news in all 35 
countries ranging from the country with the highest levels of trust Finland (M = 3.51, SD = 0.93) to Greece, 
the country with the lowest levels of trust (M = 2.76, SD = 0.95). 
 
To examine news use, we employed measures of TV use for news, newspapers use, legacy news 
websites use (websites of newspapers, radio, magazines, or TV stations), digital-born news website, and 
social media news use. Apart from examining the simple use of news sources, we further looked the use of 
a news source as a main one. We created two binary variables with those who picked digital-born and social 
media sites as their main source of news as 1, and all other mainstream news sources (print, radio, TV, 
legacy news websites) as 0. We further included two variables counting the number of off-line and online 
news brands that respondents used, as a proxy of frequency of accessing news (see Fletcher & Nielsen, 
2018). In every country, respondents were presented with a list of approximately 30 off-line and 30 news 
online brands and were asked to denote which ones they used the week leading up to the survey.5 
 
To measure the perceived influence of political and business actors on news, we used the following 
measures: Respondents were asked to indicate their levels of agreement in a 1–5-point Likert scale with 
the following statements: “The news media in my country is independent from undue political or government 
influence most of the time,” and “The news media in my country is independent from undue business or 
commercial influence most of the time.” The sum of these two measures was reversed and was used to 
 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Singapore was removed from the panel because the variable measuring 
ideological strength (measured in a left/right scale) is not relevant for Singaporean politics. In Brazil, Mexico, 
and Turkey the sample is more representative of urban rather than of national populations, given the low 
Internet penetration compared with other countries. 
5 An academic or a journalist in each country was asked to provide a list with the most popular offline and 
online news outlets in each country. 
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create a variable called “perception of outside influences” (α = .91, M = 5.38, SD = 2.07).6,7 Undue 
influences were not defined in the questionnaire; we are aware that respondents’ standards of when 
influences are “due” or “undue” differ greatly based on the cultural context. This is why we called the variable 
“perceptions of outside influences” and further included experts’ measures of press freedom, as seen below. 
 
The analysis includes sociodemographic controls (age, gender, education, and income), and 
measures of interest in news, internal political efficacy, and ideological strength (respondents who identify 
themselves 1–2 or 6–7 on a 1–7 left/right-wing placement scale). Internal political efficacy has been found 
to be significantly correlated with trust in Lee’s (2010) study of trust in news. Ideological strength at the 
individual level has been examined as a predictor of trust in news in Hanitzsch et al. (2018), among others. 
 
To examine the correlation between trust in news and freedom of press in each country, we used 
the Press Freedom Index, published annually by the Reporters Without Borders. According to the publishers, 
“it is a snapshot of the media freedom situation based on an evaluation of pluralism, independence of the 
media, quality of legislative framework and safety of journalists in each country” (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2017, para. 20). Higher scores denote lower levels of freedom of press. The scale for the countries 
of our study ranges from 7.60 for Norway to 52.98 for Turkey. To examine the correlation between trust in 
news and size of audience share of the public broadcasters in each country, we use the share of off-line PSB 
use (TV and/or radio) from the 2017 Reuters Institute Digital News Report Survey as a proxy. The reach 
varies from 83% in Austria (the number denoting the percentage of news users that accessed the PSB for 
news at least weekly) to 10% in Brazil and 18% in the United States. We are aware that the audience share 
of the public broadcaster is only one possible indicator, since the de facto independence of PSB organizations 
varies across cases (Hanretty, 2010) and possibly mediates the impact on trust. However, to our knowledge, 
no data on the actual independence are available for the set of countries we apply in our analysis. Last, we 
included a control variable measuring economic development in each country (GDP per capita), following 
the rationale that high economic development is correlated with other forms of trust, such as political or 
interpersonal trust (Tsfati & Ariely, 2014). 
 
Results 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, we ran three multilevel models. The first step of the analysis was 
to measure the interclass correlation coefficient, which was calculated at 3.3%. The coefficient represents 
the variance explained by the country-level effects in Model 0, as a share of the total variance (see Table 
1). A likelihood ratio test showed that the country effects were significant, indicating that the multilevel 
model offers a significant improvement over a linear regression model. When running a model in 35 markets 
 
6 The variable “perception of outside influences” is statistically different from the variable “trust in news,” 
denoting that it measures of a separate concept. Their correlation is moderate (.49), but if included on a 
scale with the variable “trust in news,” the Cronbach’s alpha is equal to .55, denoting poor internal 
consistency of the scale. 
7 The items regarding perceptions of business and political undue influences were used to create a 
“perceptions of outside influences” index rather than being examined separately because of multicollinearity 
issues (they are correlated at the .8 level). 
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of the 2017 sample after controlling for demographic factors and other variables that could affect trust 
(Model 1), we find that using TV for news (b = .142, p < .001), using print newspapers and magazines (b 
= .048, p < .001), using legacy news websites (b = .043, p < .001), using digital-born news websites (b = 
.037, p < .01), and using social media for news (b = .027, p < .001) are all positively correlated with trust 
in news, with TV having the strongest relationship. These findings provide support to H1, which suggested 
that traditional news exposure will be positively correlated with trust in news. Our findings do not provide 
support to H2, which suggested that nonmainstream news exposure will be negatively correlated with trust 
in news. Using digital-born outlets and social media for news for news are in fact positively correlated with 
trust.8 
 
Table 1. Individual-Level Factors Predicting Trust in the Media (Multilevel Models). 
Trust in news media Model 0 Model 1 
Age  .003*** (.000) 
Gender (female)  .071*** (.009) 
Education  −.019*** (.004) 
Income  .019** (.006) 
Internal political efficacy  .029*** (.005) 
Ideological strength  −.053*** (.011) 
Interest in news  .068*** (.006) 
Use of TV for news  .142*** (.010) 
Use of newspapers/magazines for news  .048*** (.009) 
Use of legacy websites for news  .043*** (.010) 
Use of digital-born websites for news  .037** (.013) 
Use of social media for news  .027*** (.008) 
Count of offline sources used  .006*** (.001) 
Count of online sources used  −.007*** (.001) 
Use of digital-born websites as the MAIN news source  −.022 (.016) 
Use of social media as the MAIN news source  −.068*** (.014) 
Perceptions of outside influences  −.235*** (.008) 
Constant 3.14*** 3.44*** (.073) 
Individual-level variance .989 .729 
Country-level variance .034 .017 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N = 60,579. Countries = 35.  
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
 
8 In separate models, we further investigated whether age moderates the relationship between use of 
different types of news and trust in news. The results show that the positive relationship between legacy 
news use and trust in news was stronger for older individuals: This was the case for news use via TV, print, 
legacy newspapers. (The interaction term of TV use and age is b =.002, p < .001. The interaction term of 
print use and age is b = .0009, p<.001. The interaction term of legacy news websites use and age is b = 
.0007, p < .001) Age did not moderate the relationship between digital-born website news use and trust in 
news (b = .0005, p < .1), and the relationship between social media news use and trust in news (b = .0002, 
p < .1). 
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However, we find that choosing social media as the main source of news is correlated with lower 
levels of trust in news, partly providing support to H3. Respondents who pick social media as their main 
source of news (amounting to 14% of the total sample), showed lower levels of trust in news (b = −.068, 
p < .001) than those who pick a mainstream source as their main one. However, picking a digital-born 
website as a main source of news (amounting to 7% of the total sample) had no significant association with 
trust in news at the .05 level (b = −.022, p > .05), although the direction of this relationship is as 
hypothesized. The relationships between different types of news exposure and trust in news is visualized in 
Figure 1. In addition, using many online news outlets is associated with lower levels of trust in news (b = 
−.007, p < .001), whereas using many offline news outlets (b = .006, p < .001) is associated with higher 
numbers of trust in news. The relationship between news exposure from different sources and trust in news 
is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Effects of using different types of news on trust in news. Coefficients depicted with 
95% confidence intervals. The model includes individual-level controls (Table 1). 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 suggested that the perception of news media having undue political and business 
influences is significantly and negatively correlated with trust in news. Our finding (b = −.235, p < .001) 
provides support to H4. 
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As seen in Table 2, after controlling for the individual-level characteristics (seen in Table 1), the 
two multilevel variables in our model—press freedom (b = −.0001 , p > .05) and the share of population 
using the PSB (b = −.028, p > .05)—are not significantly correlated with trust in news, thus not providing 
support for H5 and H6. The control variable GDP per capita was significantly and negatively associated with 
trust in news, suggesting that in countries with lower economic development, people are more likely to trust 
most news most of the time. A similar direction was also found by Tsfati and Ariely (2014). 
 
Table 2: Macro-Level Factors Correlated With Trust in News 
After Controlling for Individual-Level Factors. 
DV: Trust in news Model 2 Model 3 
Press freedom score (higher score = less free press) −.0001 (.002)  
Audience share of the PSB for news9  −.028 (.100) 
GDP per capita −.004* (.002) −.004** (.001) 
Country-level variance .012 .012 
N = 60.579, countries = 35   
Note. Unstandardized coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 
0.001 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This study examines the relationship between different types of news use and trust in news. It extends 
previous research (e.g., Tsfati, 2010; Tsfati & Ariely, 2014; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003), which showed that using 
online nonmainstream news sources is correlated with lower levels of trust in news. Since these studies were 
published, the use of distributed news sources and digital-born news websites has soared, calling for a 
reexamination of these relationships. Our results show that higher levels of trust are associated not only with 
the use of mainstream sources such as TV news or websites of newspapers but also with the use of 
“nonmainstream” sources such as digital-born news websites. However, using social media for news as the 
main source of news is correlated with lower levels of trust in news. Furthermore, we find that using a high 
number of online news sources, a behavior associated with social media news use (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018), 
is also correlated with lower levels of trust in news. 
 
Our mixed findings concerning the relationship between using digital nonmainstream sources and 
news media trust reflect the mixed narratives regarding the changing patterns in news consumption. On the 
one hand, more people than ever are getting news from digital-born websites that position their coverage as 
a response to the flaws of legacy journalism (Carlson & Usher, 2016). On the other hand, the current discussion 
about misinformation online is focused around news exposure to nonmainstream brands, and particularly social 
media news exposure. Of course, social media use can also mean exposure to mainstream brands that offer 
their content on social media; thus, the audience has the opportunity to engage with journalists and news 
 
9 We retested the Model 3 analysis, using PSB audience share (for broad use and not specifically for news) 
data from the European Audiovisual Observatory from 2015. We limited the analysis in the 23 countries of 
the sample for which we had data. The analysis also showed no significant association of the audience share 
of the PSB with trust in news.
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organizations using social media platforms and shape the discussion about a given news topic (Stroud, Scacco, 
Muddiman, & Curry, 2014). Still, despite possible engagement features, (trusted) mainstream media find it 
difficult on social media to make their brands visible and distinguishable. In their unbundled news consumption, 
users are less able to identify the sources of a message and thus show lower levels of brand recognition 
(Kalogeropoulos et al., 2018). As (trusted) mainstream media brands have to compete with content from all 
sorts of actors on social media, including nonprofessional actors claiming to produce news, it is not surprising 
to see that a large majority of online news users claim news media companies should do more to distinguish 
between fake and real information online (Newman et al., 2017). A recent study by the Tow Research Center 
found that 86% of journalists in the U.S. and Canada believe that social media have decreased trust in 
journalism (Rashidian et al., 2018). These fears are not unfounded. One indication comes from our data where 
we find that relying on social media for news is the only type of news use that has a negative and significant 
correlation with trust in news. Of course, more research is needed to determine the direction of the relationship 
between trust in news and social media news use. 
 
We further find that perceptions of undue political and commercial influences are strongly associated 
with lower levels of trust in news. Previous studies have documented that perceptions of corruption are 
associated with lower levels of trust in political institutions (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Hakhverdian & Mayne, 
2012; Seligson, 2002) and this study showed that perceptions of undue influences are associated with lower 
levels of trust in the news media. 
 
When looking at country-level effects, we first find only small variations in trust in news among 
countries (3.3%), even though it is significant. In a similar study of trust in the media, Tsfati and Ariely (2014) 
found that country-level variance was 13%. However, that study was based on a different set of countries than 
the one examined in this study. This could be one of the reasons why we find that contextual variables such 
as press freedom and the reach of the PSB were not significantly correlated with trust in news. These macro-
level variables are correlated with individual-level variables, such as perception of undue influences and the 
use of TV for news, of nonmainstream sources. However, we highlight the finding that across 35 countries 
from Europe to Asia-Pacific and the Americas, individual-level variation and variables such as demographics 
and news use patterns were the most important in explaining trust in news, rather than country-level variation. 
We further found similar results when we included only a subset of countries in the sample.10 
 
Another possible reason why we do not see a macro-level effect of the PSB presence in different 
countries could be the fact that in some countries PSB organizations are less independent than in others 
(Hanretty, 2010). One important next step would be to integrate data on the actual or the perceived 
independence of PSB organizations in particular, with data measuring trust specifically in PSB as a possible 
proxy. Linking data on trust in specific brands with media use data could also shed more light on a current 
observation from populism scholars, who suggest that clear mistrust of media and PSB in particular actually 
goes hand in hand with a high use of PSB. This paradoxical finding appears when we look at the behavior of 
populist political actors (Haller & Holt 2018; Krämer 2017) and when we look at audiences close to right-wing 
 
10 When running the analysis in a smaller and less diverse set of countries (the 19 Western countries included 
in the Hallin and Mancini, 2004, framework), the levels of country-level effects were similar to the ones we 
found in the wider sample. 
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populist milieus (Kösters & Jandura, 2018). Rather than avoiding them, populists often use mainstream media 
(often PSB) to attack them but also to use them as a source in those instances when their content fits the 
populist worldview. 
 
Overall, this study contributes to the literature on news media trust in several ways. First, we examine 
news media trust using a contemporary data set in a diverse set of countries. We further study the relationship 
between news consumption and news media trust using a questionnaire with detailed items on the increasingly 
complex ways people can consume news. This allows us to map the correlations of individual news use and 
news media trust, after controlling for country-level effects. 
 
Of course, our study does not come without limitations. Given the lack of panel data, we can only 
argue about correlations and not draw causal links. Future research could look at news media trust using a 
panel-wave study that allows a control of stable individual characteristics. Another limitation of the study is 
our reliance on a single item measure of news media trust. Future comparative research could operationalize 
a scale examining trust by employing a detailed scale of media credibility including components of trust, such 
as the selectivity of topics or the accuracy of the journalistic depictions (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). In addition, 
experimental research examining how different content elements can influence trust in news will further enrich 
the knowledge on trust and news consumption. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Trust in News in Different Countries. 
Countries are Ranked by Aggregate Average Trust. 
Country M SD 
Finland 3.51 0.93 
Brazil 3.46 1.08 
Portugal 3.44 0.96 
Denmark 3.37 0.85 
Netherlands 3.36 0.90 
Germany 3.33 0.99 
Poland 3.32 0.97 
Hong Kong  3.30 0.73 
Spain 3.29 1.05 
Japan 3.27 0.78 
Canada 3.27 0.98 
Norway 3.26 1.04 
Belgium 3.24 0.95 
Switzerland 3.22 0.97 
Austria 3.22 0.97 
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Ireland 3.18 1.01 
Mexico 3.18 1.13 
UK 3.15 0.97 
Australia 3.15 1.00 
Italy 3.12 0.93 
Chile 3.12 1.13 
Taiwan 3.11 0.78 
Romania 3.09 0.98 
Sweden 3.01 1.16 
Czech Republic 3.01 0.92 
Croatia 2.98 1.05 
Turkey 2.98 1.22 
Malaysia 2.98 0.90 
Hungary 2.94 0.99 
Republic of Korea 2.94 0.81 
Argentina 2.94 1.15 
U.S. 2.90 1.25 
Slovakia 2.90 0.92 
France 2.85 1.01 
Greece 2.76 0.95 
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable name Question/operationalization Descriptive Statistics 
Trust in news “Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following 
statement: “I think you can trust 
most news most of the time” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 2 = tend to 
disagree, 3 = neither agree or 
disagree, 4 = tend to agree, 5 = 
strongly agree) 
M = 3.14, SD = 1.01 
Age  M = 45.7, SD = 15.6 
Gender (1) Male, (2) Female M = 1.51, SD = 1.51 
Education “What is your highest level of 
education?” (1) I did not complete 
secondary/high school. (2) 
Secondary school, high school. 
(3) Professional qualification. (4) 
Bachelor’s degree. (5) Master’s or 
doctorate. 
M = 3.13, SD = 1.18 
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Income “Which is your household 
income?” (Recoded to: 1 = low, 2 
= middle, 3 = high) 
M = 2.03, SD = .73 
Internal political efficacy “Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following 
statements.” 
–I consider myself well-qualified 
to participate in politics 
–I feel that I have a pretty good 
understanding of the important 
political issues facing our country 
(items added to a 2–10 scale) 
M = 6.47, SD = 1.98 
Ideological strength “Some people talk about ‘left,’ 
‘right,’ and ‘center’ to describe 
parties and politicians. With this 
in mind, where would you place 
yourself on the following scale?” 1 
= slightly left of center, center, 
slightly right of center; 2 = very 
left wing, fairly left wing, very 
right wing, fairly right wing 
M = 1.28, SD = .45 
Interest in news “How interested, if at all, would 
you say you are in news?” 1 = not 
at all interested, 2 = not very 
interested, 3 = somewhat 
interested, 4 = very interested, 5 
= extremely interested 
M = 3.79 SD = .84 
Use of TV for news “Which, if any, of the following 
have you used in the last week as 
a source of news?” (0) Not 
watching TV bulletins or 24 hour 
news television channels. (1) 
Watching either TV bulletins or 24 
hour news television channels. 
M = .73. SD = .44 
Use of newspapers/magazines 
for news 
“Which, if any, of the following 
have you used in the last week as 
a source of news?” (0) Not 
reading printed newspapers or 
printed magazines. (1) Reading 
printed newspapers or printed 
magazines. 
M = .38, SD = .48 
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Use of legacy websites for news “Which, if any, of the following 
have you used in the last week as 
a source of news?” (0) Not getting 
news from the websites of 
newspapers, TV and radio 
broadcasters or news magazines. 
(1) Getting news from the 
websites of newspapers, TV and 
radio broadcasters or news 
magazines. 
M = .61, SD = .48 
Use of digital-born websites for 
news 
“Which, if any, of the following 
have you used in the last week as 
a source of news?” (0) Not getting 
news from other news websites 
(1) getting news from other news 
websites 
M = .29, SD = .45 
Use of social media for news “Which, if any, of the following 
have you used in the last week as 
a source of news?” (0) Not getting 
news via social media. (1) Getting 
news from social media. 
M = .53, SD = .49 
Count of offline sources used An addition of all the outlets the 
respondents reported to have 
used off-line during the past 
week: “Which, if any, of the 
following have you used in the 
last week as a source of news? 
Please select all that apply.” 
 
Count of online sources used An addition of all the outlets the 
respondents reported to have 
used online during the past week: 
“Which, if any, of the following 
have you used in the last week as 
a source of news? Please select all 
that apply.” 
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Perceptions of outside influences Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following 
statements: “The news media in 
my country is independent from 
undue political or government 
influence most of the time”; “The 
news media in my country is 
independent from undue business 
or commercial influence most of 
the time” (Responses ranging 
from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree). 
M = 4.62, SD = 2.08 
 
